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Abstract
At present, various efforts are being put forward to naturalize
aesthetics. One of the most controversial disciplines of
aesthetics is neuroaesthetics. The first applications of
neuroimaging of the aesthetic experience of paintings occurred
ten years ago. Over this decade, neuroscientific findings have
determined three common centers of visual aesthetic
experience: top-down processing; reward and evaluation; and
cortical sensory processing. Undoubtedly, these common
centers require better identification and further investigation.
However, the experimental data currently available make it
possible to falsify or corroborate traditional philosophical
theories of aesthetic perception and evaluation. Within an
integrated approach to aesthetics, this selective function might
constitute a future role for neuroaesthetics in humanities
research.
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1. Aesthetic naturalism
Various efforts are currently underway to naturalize aesthetics,
that is, to provide an explanation of its main topics in line with
experimental results and with the theoretical frameworks
derived from these results. The most well-known efforts are in
experimental aesthetics, evolutionary aesthetics,
neuroaesthetics, and cognitive aesthetics.[1] Taken together,
these efforts constitute the so-called “psychological approach”
to aesthetics, which seeks a scientific foundation for
aesthetics.[2]
This naturalistic approach currently lacks appropriate
interdisciplinary integration among the involved fields of
study.[3] Psychologists have focused on stimuli and context.
Neuroscientists have focused on brain systems. Evolutionists
have focused on adaptive advantages. The disciplines in the
humanities that have traditionally been concerned with
aesthetic experience, such as philosophical aesthetics, have
not interacted sufficiently.[4] Moreover, research is at an early
stage in the different scientific fields, so it inevitably shows
some conspicuous shortcomings.[5] Nonetheless, the attempt
to naturalize aesthetics represents a stimulating and
fascinating opportunity. Rather than arguing back and forth in
an intuitive, a priori, and often inconclusive way, I will
examine here what the available experimental evidence
suggests about aesthetic “hard problems.”
I will focus on neuroaesthetics, one of the most recent and
controversial of these efforts. Broadly conceived,
neuroaesthetics is the study of the neural, and also cognitive
and evolutionary, basis for the production, perception,

cognition, and appreciation of artworks, as well as nonartistic
objects and natural phenomena that evoke intense feeling,
often of pleasure, because individuals take an aesthetic
approach toward them. Thus defined, neuroaesthetics is not
limited to a particular class of objects but focuses on a certain
way in which objects can be experienced when individuals take
something like an aesthetic attitude.[6]
Some might consider neuroaesthetics the least interesting of
the naturalistic approaches. In particular, flimsy and often
simple-minded and reductionist early efforts have contributed
to a bad reputation. I will return to this issue in the
concluding paragraph. However, the increasingly extensive
and popular use of neuroimaging techniques makes
neuroaesthetics quite promising for naturalism.
There has been much work in cognitive science that eschews
imaging, but currently there is much interest in using this
powerful new tool. It is often not possible to determine from
behavioral variables alone whether a particular cognitive
process is engaged, which leads to theoretical indeterminacy.
Even if the so-called “reverse inference” (by which the
engagement of a particular cognitive process is inferred from
the activation of a particular brain region) is not deductively
valid, this common practice can provide innovative and striking
empirical evidence that is useful to distinguish and falsify
competing cognitive theories.[7] Caution should be exercised,
however, in cases where selectivity of activation in the region
of interest is low. In particular, thanks to neuroimaging
techniques, neuroaesthetics is not limited to single cases of
brain lesions and neurological illnesses. On the contrary,
scientists can explore theoretical hypothesis experimentally in
controlled conditions with the participation of healthy subjects.
Thus, they can correlate aesthetic experience with brain
activity and arrive at general trends.
In the ten years since the first applications of neuroimaging of
the aesthetic experience of paintings,[8] the collected data are
somewhat divergent. The field is still young and
heterogeneous; its scientists have different backgrounds,
interests, and questions; and there are many differences in the
stimuli, procedures, techniques, instructions, and tasks that
are used.[9] However, it is important to highlight that these
differences do not undermine the robustness of the findings.
As scientists develop their research programs, they have
strongly corroborated previously obtained results, even when
they have modified the experimental settings to introduce new
variables and features. Typical examples of robust findings
are the experimental results on perception and aesthetic
attitude realized by Cupchik and colleagues, Leder and
colleagues’ work on appreciation and aesthetic judgment, and
Gallese and colleagues’ work on mirror neurons and aesthetic
experience.[10] Obviously, this robustness is not a fortuitous
and casual fact. It derives from the use of rigorous methods
already tested outside the field of aesthetics. For this reason,
within neuroaesthetics there is a strong consensus on
empirical data achieved with neuroimaging techniques.
I believe it is possible to accommodate the main findings from
these data within a consistent framework if we do not overlook
two general principles of ordinary brain functioning. First,

precisely like all other higher cognitive functions, visual
aesthetic perception and appreciation are not based on a
single, separate, and special module. On the contrary,
aesthetic perception and appreciation reflect the dynamic
interaction of several information-processing levels and
stages: attention, perceptual analysis, memory integration,
explicit classification, decision-making, evaluation, and
emotion.[11] Second, the brain activity underlying aesthetic
perception and appreciation occurs within varying time frames:
the processing levels and stages are linked in sequence as well
as through continuous feedback loops.[12]
Keeping in mind that aesthetic perception and appreciation
emerge from various combinations of multiple responses, it is
possible to suggest (a) how recent scientific results have
successfully determined three core centers of the complex
neural network that enables aesthetic perception and
appreciation, (b) what the future challenges for
neuroaesthetics are in terms of better identification of these
crucial patterns, and (c) why these results are relevant for
confirming or disconfirming traditional theories of aesthetic
perception and evaluation in philosophical aesthetics.
I will focus, in particular, on empirical findings that concern the
aesthetic attitude. As is well known, this notion stems from
the Kantian concept of disinterest: when we judge an object
aesthetically we are unconcerned with whether and how it may
further our practical aims. According to influential aestheticattitude theories of the twentieth century, bearing an aesthetic
attitude toward an object enables a richer experience of it
because this attitude has no purpose beyond that of
interpreting the object outside the context of our personal
needs and ends.[13]
In line with naturalistic approaches,[14] the aesthetic attitude
represents the specific mental disposition that gives unity to
aesthetic experience conceived as a temporally extended
episode that involves perceptual, cognitive, imaginative, and
emotional processes. As a basic framework, the aesthetic
attitude coordinates these multiple activities into an integrated
experience. It also realizes this function of integration by
virtue of a specific set of properties. It influences the global
functioning of attention. Ordinary and automatic routines of
perception and categorization are inhibited so that interpreters
can identify with the aesthetic objects in a global effort
involving different mental faculties. The aesthetic attitude
influences the global functioning of consciousness, in particular
increasing the focus/fringe, center/periphery, figure/ground
dynamics of consciousness. During the aesthetic experience,
subjects cannot collect all the relevant information
immediately in a single act of consciousness. They explore the
aesthetic object in a serial manner, with continuous feedback
between bottom-up and top-down processes, so that attention
is directed both analytically to the components of the aesthetic
object and synthetically to the aesthetic object as a whole,
with a tension that avoids repetition and boredom.
The aesthetic attitude influences the global functioning of
belief dynamics.   Whatever format they have— symbolic or
sub-symbolic—the beliefs in the aesthetic attitude are not
referentially constrained: like beliefs in playful pretense and

symbolic games, they are marked off and quarantined from
the actual state of the world. The aesthetic attitude influences
the global functioning of motivation. The epistemic goal (the
goal of acquiring knowledge through the interaction with the
aesthetic object) supports the specific goals activated by the
exploratory activity. These specific goals are derived from the
aesthetic object and are simulated off-line: pretending to
adopt them, subjects feed the goals into their own decision
mechanism without producing any effective decision or
behavior.
According to both traditional philosophical theories and
naturalistic approaches, the aesthetic attitude involves
detachment from referential conditions, instrumental goals,
and daily concerns, but not disengagement from knowing and
learning. Subjects do not have personal goals, ordinary
desires, or practical needs. Their mental activity develops
freely, guided only by the structure and the properties of the
aesthetic object. Some philosophers have doubted the
existence of the aesthetic attitude so conceived, judging it a
mere myth.[15] Others have considered it an ideology[16] or
a status distinction.[17] Hard problems about the aesthetic
attitude concern both the role of aesthetic appreciation[18]
and the role of affect.[19]
As already mentioned, if we consider neuroaesthetics in a
broad sense, this emerging field of study largely focuses on the
aesthetic attitude, engaged in different domains (painting,
design, architecture, dance, music, bodies, faces, and so on). I
shall try to identify here the main neurological basis of the
aesthetic attitude concerning paintings and what might be
considered a kind of “case study” in what neuroaesthetics can
do if it is not limited to a mere catalog of brain regions and if
it successfully interacts with traditional, philosophical
aesthetics.
2. Top-down processing
Many findings show that the first common center of aesthetic
perception and appreciation involves the engagement of topdown processing and cognitive control. In this mode, subjects
suppress everyday concerns and adopt an aesthetic viewing
orientation; many experiments show that the same object is
apprehended and evaluated differently when it is viewed as
artwork.[20]
Daily perception is pragmatic; that is, it is oriented towards
the identification of objects in visual scenes. This inclination is
so automatic that, in an experiment, naïve participants
reported perceiving objects in pictorial compositions that were
devoid of recognizable objects.[21] The neural systems
underpinning aesthetic perception and appreciation are not
limited to those involved in object recognition. In a crucial
experiment, subjects without formal training in visual art were
exposed to thirty-two representational paintings. Prior to
entering the fMRI scanner, participants received two different
sets of instructions in turn. For the pragmatic condition, they
were instructed to apply an everyday informational criterion
when viewing the paintings, approaching them in an objective
and detached manner. For the aesthetic condition, they were
instructed to approach the paintings in a subjective and
engaged manner and to focus on the paintings’ colors, tones,

composition, and shapes. The results revealed that activation
in the lateral prefrontal cortex was higher in the aesthetic than
in the pragmatic condition. In contrast, the structures known
to mediate object recognition were more activated under the
pragmatic condition.[22]
According to what is currently known, the lateral prefrontal
cortex is typically associated with cognitive control (in this
case, inhibiting the function of object recognition and orienting
perception towards the aesthetic mode). It is essential in
keeping the main goal active (in this case, the received
instruction relative to the aesthetic condition) while the
subject is realizing sub-goals (in this case, the processing of
perceptual, structural, and stylistic properties). The lateral
prefrontal cortex is correlated with self-related information (in
this case, the internal set of subjective reactions and mental
states prompted by the stimulus).[23]
In another crucial experiment, expertise was measured with
knowledge questions about artistic styles, painters, and
paintings. Self-reports and facial electromyography showed
that, compared to non-experts, experts like more negative,
provocative, and disturbing artworks (such as the works of
Francis Bacon, Damien Hirst, Willem de Kooning, and Louise
Bourgeois) and have attenuated reactions to them. These
results suggest that the aesthetic orientation is emotionally
distanced. Moreover, they indicate that experts, who are
exposed to art more frequently and are more skilled at
decoupling and “quarantining” the goal relevance of the
stimulus, are less responsive to the artworks’ direct affective
valence than are nonexperts. Furthermore, their emotional
response to valence is attenuated by their attention to other
features, such as structural, stylistic, and formal
properties.[24]
Finally, analyses of magnetoencephalographic data with timefrequency procedures reveal that the oscillation power
associated with beautiful stimuli in all four frequency bands is
significantly greater than the power associated with nonbeautiful stimuli 400ms after stimulus onset and beyond. This
greater synchronization might corroborate the hypothesis that
the adoption of the aesthetic orientation establishes a global
neuronal workspace, allowing the coordination of multiple
brain areas.[25]
Within these results, the crucial issue concerns their ecological
validity: almost all studies are performed in laboratories and
utilize specially (often artificially) designed successions of
simplified and decontextualized stimuli. Varying instructions
(mere observation, objective and detached judgment,
symmetrical judgment, explicit liking or preference ratings,
and so on) are given to participants. Often studies do not
include experimental control of general attention mechanisms
and task-related efforts.[26]
However, it is important to stress that the ecological limits do
not mean that empirical findings obtained in laboratory are not
applicable to real life. On the contrary, controlled procedures
in a simplified situation often allow better understanding of
cognitive processes activated in daily elaboration that is
intricate, multifaceted, and impure. This point is clearly
indicated by two recent experiments concerning aesthetic

appreciation: for the first time these experiments empirically
demonstrate the deep relationship between perceptual insights
and aesthetic pleasure.
In the first study,[27] photographs of cubist artworks by
Picasso, Braque, and Gris were shown to participants without
expertise in cubist art. The study was structured in two
blocks, each showing the stimuli in a randomized order.
During the first block, subjects had to rate the pictures on
liking. During the second block, subjects rated how well they
could detect objects within the artwork. All ratings were
chosen from a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7
(‘very’). Data across participants revealed a strong relationship
between the detectability of objects and liking, confirming that
in aesthetic perception, form recognition is closely related to
appreciation.
In the second study,[28] two-tone images either containing a
hidden form (i.e. a face) or not were repeatedly presented for
half a second to participants. Stimuli were shown in a
randomized order blockwise 13 times. The tasks alternated
blockwise between choosing from a 7-point scale from 1 (‘not
at all’) to 7 (‘very good’) how much one liked the picture and
a detecting block. The latter comprised two ratings on a 1 plus
7-point scale (0: ‘no face recognized’; 7: ‘very clear’). Insight
was defined by the highest gain in clearness between two
subsequent blocks per participant and stimulus. All liking
ratings per participant and block were then shifted according
to their temporal occurrence relative to the insight block. Data
clearly demonstrated that liking significantly increased only
after having an insight; the intensity of insight, defined as
degrees of clearness ratings, showed direct influences on the
degrees of liking.
These two experiments are based on typical laboratory
situations: there are artificial successions of stimuli, Likertscale ratings, and so on. However, it is precisely this poor
ecological condition that enables a better understanding of
aesthetic appreciation and its dynamics in real life
cognition.[29] It is the presence of novelty, incongruity,
unpredictability, and surprise that enables aesthetic pleasure,
not repeated presentation or immediacy of recognition as
such. The reduction of uncertainty, that is the transition from
an initial state of uncertainty to a subsequent state of
increased predictability, is rewarding, pleasurable, and
enjoyable in itself. Whereas the initial discrepant condition is
unpleasant and annoying, there is an immediate effect of the
insight during form recognition on aesthetic appreciation: the
increase in processing fluency amounts to an increase in
positive affect. However, this effect may be temporally
limited: fluency might not increase in a linearly progressive
fashion, but it might decrease again in the course of
elaboration.
Moreover, the data revealing that perceptual insights within
difficult pictures increase appreciation also fit very well with
the widespread appreciation of great modern artworks, like
cubist ones, that show partial, ambiguous, and contrary clues;
block ordinary sensory-motor operations; blatantly violate
regular, clear, symmetrical forms; destroy familiarity and daily
expectations; trigger open processes of categorization.[30]

So even with ecological limits, the data are very interesting,
particularly in relation to controversial issues concerning the
aesthetic attitude. In line with the Kantian notion of the
aesthetic stance, the collected results indicate that the
aesthetic attitude exists. When someone takes this kind of
attitude, neuroimaging indicates that a specific neural and
cognitive configuration is activated. This configuration requires
high-level cognitive control; it is a top-down viewing
orientation; it inhibits daily concerns; it is focused on internal
subjective reactions; it is emotionally disinterested; and it
allows for a great integration and blending of stimulus-driven
contents and structural, formal, and stylistic properties. Thus,
the available evidence explicitly falsifies all the perspectives
that deny the existence, the specificity, or the relevance of the
aesthetic attitude.
3. Reward and evaluation
The second common center of aesthetic perception and
appreciation involves the engagement of both the reward
circuit and the evaluative judgment process. In line with the
hypothesis that the aesthetic orientation directs attention
towards internally-generated and self-related information,
several studies (in which participants are usually asked to
explicitly judge a visual stimulus either as beautiful or ugly)
have reported activation of cortical and subcortical areas that
are considered to be part of affective, emotional, and
evaluative processes—such as the ventral striatum, the
caudate nucleus, the substantia nigra, the thalamus, the
amygdalae, the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the orbitofrontal
cortex.[31]
Three areas in particular seem to provide essential support for
aesthetic perception and appreciation: the amygdalae, the
insula, and the medial prefrontal cortices. It is well
established that the amygdalae intervene in reward processing
and correlate their activity with changes in predictability of
stimuli. So, the amygdalae might signal the goodness of a
solution found when interpreting the artworks in terms of their
representational efficiency. Phenomenologically, this process
might be experienced as positive.[32] The insula is typically
associated with internal visceral perception, the feeling of
emotion, and the subjective dimension of experience.[33] As
noted above, the medial prefrontal cortices correlate with selfrelated mental processes, particularly with the introspective
evaluation of internal mental states.[34]
Adopting the distinction between fast, automatic affective
reactions and slow, analytical cognitive evaluations,[35] the
aesthetic judgment, conceived not as an immediate
appreciation but as an extended evaluation, can be considered
to be the final result of the stratified and complex process of
aesthetic perception and appreciation, wherein bottom-up
construction of the stimulus is intimately linked with overall
self-related information, made up of the multiple subjective
responses prompted by the processing of the stimulus and its
properties.[36]
For these results, the crucial issue concerns the limited
temporal resolution of fMRI, a strongly limiting factor that
might prevent making distinctions among stages that quickly

follow each other.[37] Taking this into account, it might be
difficult to differentiate the neural activation related to
emotions from the neural activation related to aesthetic
appreciation as such.[38] From this point of view,
psychological studies based on priming procedures indicate
that while emotions are typically associated with the contents
represented by an aesthetic object, aesthetic appreciation is a
function of the perceiver’s (fluent or disfluent) processing
experiences which, in turn, are influenced by the properties of
the aesthetic object—such as prototypicality, symmetry,
clarity, and figural goodness, but also novelty, incongruity,
unpredictability, and surprise.[39]
In any case, the collected results are very interesting in
relation to the controversial question concerning aesthetic
value. They certainly do not show that there is a cognitively
necessary way to engage with works of art and other aesthetic
objects. However, the experimental results undoubtedly
indicate that, when an individual is asked to take something
like an aesthetic stance, the resulting aesthetic experience
always constitutes an evaluative experience based on different
kinds and stages of evaluation, whatever the stimulus, even an
abstract painting without any figurative contents and familiar
meanings. Each processing stage is permanently linked to
appreciation, and this appreciation guides subsequent
aesthetic processing, ultimately leading to a satisfying
understanding being successfully revealed.[40]
The experimental results are also relevant to the controversial
question concerning the role of affect. They undoubtedly show
that with stimuli as varied as computer-generated,
geometrical, or meaningless patterns, the resulting aesthetic
engagement constitutes an affective experience. This does not
mean that every engagement with a work of art and other
aesthetic objects must have this feature. However, when
someone looks at things aesthetically, each processing stage
can increase or decrease the positive or negative affective
state until a final (more or less) satisfactory state is achieved.
More precisely and in line with the Kantian idea of
disinterestedness, the aesthetic experience constitutes a selfcontained affective experience. It does not go beyond itself
towards an external goal, practical utility, or functional
problem solving. It is a self-reinforced and self-rewarding
experience that is its own source of pleasure and
satisfaction.[41]
4. Cortical sensory processing
The third common center of aesthetic perception and
appreciation involves the activation of low-level and high-level
cortical sensory processing. Engaging the visual properties of
paintings enhances both category-specific activation (for
instance, paintings of landscapes activate the
parahippocampus whereas portraits activate the fusiform
gyrus) and general increased activity within the ventral
occipito-temporal visual cortices.[42]
Several findings suggest that the same mechanisms that
enable our interaction with non-artworks are co-opted for
aesthetic perception and appreciation. For instance, symmetry
judgment and aesthetic judgment tasks enhance the activation
of parietal regions and pre-motor areas which typically

subserve visuospatial coding and motor mapping.[43] More
specifically, areas in the medial orbitofrontal cortex that
respond to beauty in faces also respond to beauty in
paintings.[44]
Several fMRI studies show that the widely distributed network
of aesthetic perception and appreciation is sensitive to
expertise and source information. Medial orbitofrontal and
prefrontal activation in particular correlate with expertise:
compared to non-experts, experts show a greater activation in
these areas when they like images.[45] In the same vein,
activation in these areas correlates with contextual
expectations. For example, subjects in the fMRI scanner were
presented with artworks that were randomly labeled as being
either sourced from a gallery or computer-generated. As
expected, aesthetic ratings were significantly higher for stimuli
believed to be sourced from a gallery. This contextual
manipulation moderated activity in the medial orbitofrontal
and prefrontal cortices. Most interestingly, when naïve
participants were told that computer-generated images
belonged to a museum, the activation of these areas was
greater.[46] In line with these data, other experiments
confirm that people’s appreciation of artworks is enhanced
when supplemented by explanatory information such as titles,
artists’ names, biographies, and so on. For instance, aesthetic
ratings for photographs increased when elaborate titles were
added.[47]   Aesthetic perception and appreciation thus reflect
not only their proximal neural processes but also their distal
developmental and educational histories, together with the
contextual histories of artworks.[48]
The crucial issue in these results concerns domainspecificity.[49] Aesthetic perception and appreciation repurpose already available general mechanisms and activate
brain regions involved in a multiplicity of cognitive activities
completely unrelated to aesthetics and art. At issue is the
extent to which the activation of these mechanisms and areas
is specifically relevant to aesthetic perception and
appreciation. The observation of Classical and Renaissance
sculptures, for example, elicited activation of the ventral
premotor cortex and the posterior parietal cortex, suggesting
motor resonance congruent with the implied movements
portrayed in the sculptures.[50] However, if mirror systems
represent a necessary condition of perception, does their
activation really distinguish aesthetic perception and
appreciation from ordinary perception?
If we tie the evidence concerning sensory processing together
with the evidence concerning cognitive control and evaluation,
it is possible to obtain a revealing perspective. Taken
together, all the data I have collected suggest that
neuroaesthetics aligns with hermeneutics. In line with the
hermeneutic circle, all the empirical results of neuroimaging
indicate that aesthetic perception and appreciation, conceived
as a gestalt-like experience, involve all of the following: a
complex and multi-level integration and coordination of highorder and low-order dynamics; specific and general
processing; top-down attitude and knowledge and bottom-up
construction of stimuli; constructive and stimulus-driven
receptive attitudes; global attention toward the stimulus as a
whole and focal attention to the details of the stimulus;

analytical and synthetic orientations; backward-loops and
forward anticipations; interpretation and meaning assignment
based on more or less extensive historical knowledge; more or
less informative contextual information, appropriate
expectations, and highly specialized skills; and both early and
late, immediate and extensive evaluative processes.
5. The (possible) heuristic role of neuroaesthetics
Neuroaesthetics is an emerging field: at present it is difficult
to predict its future status and function. However, what is
clear is that neuroaesthetics cannot have either an inflationary
role or a deflationary one.
In contrast to the classical perspectives of the most wellknown theorists of neuroaesthetics—namely Zeki,
Ramachandran, and Changeux[51]—this new field cannot
constitute the foundation of aesthetics. On the contrary, it
requires the conceptual mediation of traditional philosophical
aesthetics to define its conceptual framework (for instance, to
precisely define the concepts of aesthetic experience and art)
and to determine the multiple artistic and aesthetic
phenomena it investigates with experimental tools: Western
or non-Western artworks, different art genres (paintings,
sculpture, music, and so on), different levels of artworks
(high-level art versus ordinary, popular, mass art),[52]
aesthetic objects such as designs or decorations, natural
phenomena such as landscapes or faces, beautiful versus notbeautiful manifestations, and so on. Furthermore, the
conceptual mediation of philosophical aesthetics is essential
because the field of study is even more complex than
previously stated: a given aesthetic object often serves a
multiplicity of purposes for different people with different skills,
in different contexts, and at different times.[53]
On the other hand, neuroaesthetics does not fit with all the
perspectives that completely deny its value and interest,
judging it to be inevitably and negatively reductionist. Various
critics argue that neuroaesthetics cannot grasp the “why” and
the “what for” of aesthetic processes; cannot offer any basis
for the evaluation of art as great, good, or bad; that it
investigates only general conditions of aesthetic perception
and appreciation, maximizing the commonalities among people
but losing what makes a particular experience unique; and so
on.[54]
First, many of these criticisms do not concern only
neuroaesthetics but can also be applied to neuroscience and
cognitive science in general. As is true regarding those who
make general criticisms of neurocognitive sciences, these
critics are, from a methodological point of view, paradoxically
reductionist. In fact, they deny the opportunity to investigate
different levels of explanation and understanding. According to
“explicatory pluralism,” one of the methodological conceptions
most accepted in neurocognitive sciences, the ordinary
functioning of research requires simultaneous investigations of
the same explicandum at different levels to enhance the
development of each level.[55] From this point of view, at
present it is very difficult to find a neuroscientist who thinks to
explain the single and irreducible qualia of the subjective
experience or, in the same vein, a researcher in the field of
neuroaesthetics who projects and realizes experiments with

the goal of substituting them for art criticism.[56]
Second, over the last two decades, under pressure from
neurophenomenology,[57] neurocognitive sciences have
increasingly integrated the phenomenal experience, in the
form of extended subjective reports, into the construction and
validation of theories, thus overcoming in large measure the
opposition between first-person descriptions and third-person
explanations. Along these lines, neuroaesthetics could modify
its typical approach based on severe quantification and
decomposition. Hitherto experiments have usually required
participants to use some sort of rating scale to quantify some
dimension of their reaction to the presented stimuli under the
(unproven) presupposition that aesthetic experience can be
meaningfully decomposed and quantified.[58]
Third, and most importantly, it is absolutely untrue that the
scientific psychological approach to aesthetics and the
traditional philosophical approach to aesthetics are by
definition two completely unrelated kinds of thinking without
any possible mediation. On the contrary, as I have sketched
out here, it is critical to acknowledge that, even in its current
and deeply limited version, neuroaesthetics can provide crucial
evidence to falsify or corroborate relevant theories of
philosophical aesthetics. Obviously, the currently available
evidence is far from exhaustive or conclusive. However, if
critics (and leading theorists)[59] avoid stultifying
neuroaesthetics, thus reducing it to a mere straw man, it has
the potential to become more than a mere catalog of brain
regions whose activity is related with aesthetic experience. It
could gain an essential heuristic and selective role,
contributing to questions raised about the arts and aesthetics
in humanities research.
Whatever the future role of neuroaesthetics, the vast majority
of researchers in the field know very well and explicitly affirm
that in its present, very limited form, the effort to determine
the neural underpinnings of the cognitive and affective
processing that underlies aesthetic perception and appreciation
represents only the beginning of their enterprise, not the end.
Above all, they know very well that it is a part of the story,
not the whole story.[60]
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